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Through the Looking Glass: Recent 
Developments in Affirmative Action 
Kathleen Morrist 
Alice could never quite make out, in thinking it over afterwards, how it was 
that they began: all she remembers is, that they were running hand in hand, 
and the Queen went so fast that it was all she could do to keep up with her: 
and still the Queen kept crying 'Faster! Faster!' ... The most curious part of 
the thing was, that the trees and the other things round them never changed 
their places at all: however fast they went, that never seemed to pass any-
thing . . . suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted, they stopped 
... Alice looked around her in great surprise. 'Why, I do believe we've been 
under this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it was!' 'Of course it is,' 
said the Queen .... 'Now here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to 
keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere else, you must run 
twice as fast as that!>! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 1995 saw three major developments that threaten the future 
of voluntary affirmative action programs in California and nationwide. On 
June 12, the U.S. Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2 
held that voluntary federal affirmative action programs should be subject to 
the same "strict scrutiny" reserved for all other racial classifications.3 The 
following month, the Regents of the University of California voted to abol-
ish the use of race and gender as factors in admissions and hiring in the 
Copyright © 1996, BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAw JOURNAL. 
t J.D. cand .• Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
1 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LooKING GLASS 
180-82 (1987). 
2 liS S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
3 The Supreme Court has read the Equal Protection Clause to require different levels of scrutiny for 
different classifications. "Strict scrutiny," which is applied to suspect classifications (based upon 
race or national origin), requires that the classification be necessary to achieve a compelling state 
objective. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216-17 (1982). "Intermediate scrutiny," which is applied 
to quasi-suspect classifications (based upon gender), requires only that the classification be sub-
stantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The rational basis test is applied to classifications which are neither sus-
pect nor quasi-suspect, and requires only that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental objective. San Antonio Indep. 5ch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973). 
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University of California system. Finally, last year the so-called "California 
Civil Rights Initiative" ("CCRI") was presented to the citizens of California 
as a possible ballot measure for the November 1996 statewide elections. 
The ccru would outlaw the use of racial "preferences" in any organization 
receiving state funds. This piece will briefly discuss these developments, 
highlighting the oddly distorted mix of fact and fantasy that has surrounded 
the affirmative action debates. 
n. THE COURT 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Adarand came as no 
shock to those who have followed recent Supreme Court decisions. The 
Court had laid the groundwork for Adarand six years earlier in City of Rich-
mond v. Croson, 4 in which it held that state voluntary affirmative action 
programs would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Croson, the court struck down a Richmond, Virginia law that 
required prime contractors hired by the city to subcontract at least 30% of 
the dollar amount of the contract to minority business enterprises, unless 
they could show that such a requirement could not realistically be met. The 
City of Richmond (which is 50% African-American) provided the Court 
with a study showing that only 0.67% of the city's prime construction con-
tracts had been awarded to minority businesses between 1978 and 1983. 
Moreover, Richmond showed that the contractor's associations (which pro-
vided the most vehement opposition to the plan) had virtually no minority 
membership. 
Nevertheless, the Court decided to apply strict scrutiny on the grounds 
that, "absent searching judicial inquiry into the justifications for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications 
are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by 
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."5 A classi-
fication will only survive strict scrutiny if the governmental objective is 
shown to be "compelling," and the classification is "narrowly tailored" to 
that objective. Historically, almost all classifications have failed this strin-
gent test,6 and Croson was no exception. 
Justice Marshall, in a scathing dissent, denounced the decision to apply 
strict scrutiny to voluntary affirmative action programs. In so doing, he 
alluded ruefully to Virginia's long history of racial violence: 
4 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
5 [d. at 493. 
6 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1451-52 (2d ed. 1988). Ironically, 
exceptions include two cases that justified internment of Japanese Americans during World War 
II on national security grounds: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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It is a welcome symbol of racial progress when the former capital of the 
Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of racial discrimination 
in its midst. ... The essence of the majority's position is that Richmond has 
failed to catalog adequate findings to prove that past discrimination has 
impeded minorities from joining or participating fully in Richmond's con-
struction contracting industry. I find deep irony in second-guessing Rich-
mond's judgment on this point.7 
The theoretical underpinnings of Croson, which essentially equated 
voluntary attempts to remedy discrimination with invidious discrimination 
itself, led almost inevitably to Adarand. In Adarand, the Court struck down 
a plan crafted by the Federal Small Business Administration, in which 
prime contractors were given financial incentives to hire subcontractors cer-
tified as small businesses controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals. Justice O'Connor's lead opinion in Adarand simply 
extended the Croson rule-that state affirmative action programs must be 
subject to strict scrutiny-to federal affirmative action programs. The 
Court then restated the bedrock principle underlying its analysis, that racial 
classifications should be consistently reviewed under strict scrutiny regard-
less of context or governmental intent: "any person, of whatever race, has 
the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution 
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment 
under the strictest judicial scrutiny."8 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ste-
vens argued that "[t]here is no moral or constitutional equivalence between 
a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to 
eradicate racial subordination. . . . The consistency that the Court espouses 
would disregard the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a wel-
come mat.,,9 
For women of color, Croson and Adarand highlight, indeed exacer-
bate, the dilemma posed by discrimination laws structured around either 
race or gender. While these cases circumscribe voluntary affirmative action 
programs based upon racial classifications, they say nothing about gender 
classifications. A question arises, then, around whether African-American 
women, Asian women, LatinaslChicanas, Native American women, and 
others are "people of color" or "women" for the purposes of equal protec-
tion (and therefore affirmative action). In "A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Law and Politics,"lO Professor Kimberle Crenshaw 
explains how antidiscrimination law is structurally hostile to claims by 
women of color, because it is constructed from the perspective of White 
males: 
7 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-29. 
8 Adarand. 115 S. Ct. at 2111. 
91d. at 2120-21. 
10 Kimberle Crenshaw. A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics. in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195 (David Kairys ed .• 1991). 
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[G]ender discrimination, imagined from the perspective of White men, is 
what happens to White women; race discrimination is what happens to Black 
men .... Black women are protected only to the extent that their experiences 
coincide with either of the two groups. Where their experiences are distinct, 
Black women will encounter difficulty articulating their claims as long as 
approaches prevail which completely obscure problems of intersectionality. II 
Despite the power of arguments for developing intersectional theories 
of discrimination, made not only by Crenshaw, but also by professors 
Regina Austin,12 Paulette Caldwell,13 and others, American courts have 
explicitly rejected intersectionality analysis,14 maintaining that discrimina-
tion can only be legally recognized on the basis of race or gender. Thus, 
the lived experience of women of color continues to go unrecognized in the 
courts. 
Ironically, the Court's narrow view of invidious classifications may 
allow some women of color to take advantage of gender-based affirmative 
action programs, since gender-based affirmative action programs will con-
tinue to be reviewed under a lesser standard, "intermediate scrutiny."15 
This raises the question of whether the pursuit of intersectional classifica-
tions continues to make sense from a purely pragmatic point of view, given 
that the level of scrutiny applied to these classifications could be strict scru-
tiny. However, the long-term political goals of women of color will proba-
bly be best served by explicit recognition of their life experiences in the 
courts, regardless of short-term sacrifices. 
While the Court's failure to recognize intersectional identity and dis-
crimination presents particular obstacles for women of color, the more 
deeply pervasive injustice in antidiscrimination law lies in its baseline 
assumptions. Crenshaw argues that the real danger for women and people 
of color lies in the fact that: 
Underlying dominant conceptions of discrimination . . . is a view that the 
wrong which antidiscrimination law addresses is the use of race or gender 
factors to interfere with decisions that would otherwise be fair or neutral. 
This process-based definition is not grounded in a bottom-up commitment to 
improve the substantive conditions for those who are victimized by the inter-
play of numerous factors. 16 
11 Id. at 197 (footnote omitted). 
12 See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 539 (1989). 
13 See Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 365 (1991). 
14 See Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding the right of 
employers to prohibit categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the workplace); Chambers 
v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh'g 
denied, 840 F.2d 583 (1988) (allowing a rule, in which employer could fire unmarried counsellors 
for becoming pregnant. to stand as a business necessity and bona fide occupational qualification 
defense to a Title VII suit). 
15 "Intermediate scrutiny," which was first introduced by the Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976), requires only that the classification serve an "important" governmental objective, and that 
it be "substantially related" to the achievement of that objective. 
16 Crenshaw, supra note 10, at 201. 
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This presumption, that the underlying system is fundamentally fair, clearly 
underlies the Supreme Court's reasoning in Adarand. The majority opinion 
takes as a given that a fair system is an unfettered system; thus, attempts to 
remedy racism are included as among the evils which interfere with neutral 
decisions made by employers. In fact, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, 
explicitly declares "racial paternalism and its unintended consequences" 
(Le., affirmative action) to be "as poisonous and pernicious as any other 
form of discrimination."17 
This odd, ahistorical portrayal of affirmative action-in which the 
Supreme Court has essentially placed racism and remedies for race discrim-
ination into the same moral category-reveals the way in which debates 
around affirmative action have taken on a kind of dark, grotesque, "Alice in 
Wonderland" quality. 18 Similarly distorted rhetoric has pervaded the fight 
over affirmative action at the University of California. 
ID. THE UNIVERSITY 
Following close on the heels of Adarand-but quite a bit more 
extreme-was a decision of the University of California Regents to prohibit 
the use of "race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as criteria" 
for admissions, contracting or employment on the nine public University of 
California campuses. 
I use the word "extreme" because while Croson and Adarand merely 
limit the use of race-conscious programs to particular circumstances,I9 the 
Regents voted to ban affirmative action altogether. By contrast, in 1978, 
the Supreme Court held in Regents of University of California v. Bakke20 
that a university has a compelling interest in taking the race of applicants 
into account in its admissions process in order to foster greater diversity in a 
student body?1 In his plurality opinion, Justice Powell conceded that the 
maintenance of diversity in a university leads to an atmosphere "conducive 
to speculation, experiment and creation."22 Under Bakke, only admissions 
processes that use fixed numerical quotas, or use race as the sole or primary 
factor in admissions, would be too rigid to pass constitutional scrutiny 
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?3 
17 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119. 
18 I first heard this "Alice in Wonderland" metaphor in a lecture on affirmative action by Professor 
Robert Post, Boalt Hall School of Law, November 1995. 
19 The circumstances are those in which the employer has made a showing that a program is "neces-
sary," and where the program is "narrowly tailored" to remedy the problem. 
20 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
21 [d. at 312. 
22 [d. at 312 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 263 
(1917». 
23 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attomey General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 
Deparonent of Justice to General Counsels 24 (June 28, 1995) (on file with author). 
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I also use the word "extreme" because, contrary to a long tradition of 
"shared governance" between governing bodies of the campuses, under 
intense political pressure from California Governor and then-presidential 
candidate Pete Wilson, the Regents acted unilaterally and in the face of the 
"united opposition" of the University's president, all nine chancellors, 
faculty, and students.24 Thus, the war in the University of California over 
its affirmative action programs has developed along two fronts. On one 
front, advocates argue about the need for and wisdom of affirmative action 
as a means of promoting excellence in the public universities, as well as 
creating a public culture dedicated to healing racial rifts. University of Cal-
ifornia President l.W. Pe]tason, in a speech at the March 16, 1995 Regents' 
meeting, argued that: 
as the public university of our nation's most racially and ethnically diverse 
mainland state, the University has an obligation to encompass that diversity 
in its student body, its faculty, and its staff. What happens in our university 
campuses will have much to do with our ability to forge an emerging new 
culture, a culture that is inclusive, varied, and respectful of difference, but 
which also unites us into a community that can live, work, prosper, and flour-
ish in our constitutional democracy. It may well threaten California's social 
and economic future if we make it harder for minority and disadvantaged 
people to learn or work in the University of California and other institutions 
of higher education in this state. 25 
The battle's second front is not on the substance of affirmative action 
policies, but on the process of decision making. On Tuesday, October 17, 
1995, the Academic Senate of the University of California at Berkeley-in 
a show of unprecedented solidarity-passed a resolution by 124-2, calling 
on the Regents to rescind their votes. 26 The faculty has taken the position 
that, regardless of the merits of affirmative action programs, the Regents 
should not have made such a monumental policy decision in the face of 
such strong unilateral opposition from all other comers of the University of 
California.27 
The faculty has also taken pains to point out that under the California 
Constitution, the Regents are bound to administer the University's affairs 
"entirely independent of all political or sectarian infiuence."28 Governor 
Wilson defends his position by asserting that in his opinion, "we are happily 
in a time when a number of the compensations that were earlier advanced to 
make up for earlier discrimination are no longer needed. "29 In reality, how-
ever, education and employment statistics in Wilson's own home state pro-
vide glaring evidence that the opposite is true-that affirmative action is 
24 Edward Epstein. Faculty Opposes Gutting Affirmative Action at UC. S.F. CHRON •• Oct. 21. 1995. 
at A13. 
25 Statement of l.W. Peltason. President. 2-3 (March 16. 1995). 
26 Epstein. supra note 24. at A13. 
27 [d. 
28 CAL. CONST. art. IX. § 9. 
29 Cathleen Decker. Afjir11Ultive Action: Why Battle Erupted. L.A. TIMES. Feb. 19. 1995. at A2. 
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needed now more than ever in order to achieve even a minimal level of 
racial justice. For example, the 1995 University of California at Berkeley 
undergraduate admissions program, which applied the U. C. affirmative 
action program, resulted in a class that is 31 % White, 6.6% Black, 1.7% 
Native American, 15% Chicano/Latino, and 36% Asian.30 The U.C. Berke-
ley admissions office estimates that the percentage of African-American 
and Latino students at the University will drop from 22% to less than 8% if 
the Regents' vote goes into effect.31 
Moreover, public employee salary and employment data, gathered by 
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), show that 
although minorities in California have made some gains in public jobs since 
affirmative action programs were implemented, people of color employed 
by the state still make considerably less than Whites, and women earn sig-
nificantly less than men.32 In addition, minorities and women tend to be 
"ghettoized" into lower-paying, lower-skilled jobs. In 1993, for example, 
76% of the new hires in the highest category of public jobs-"officials and 
administrators"-were White, and 62.7% were male. By contrast, Blacks 
were hired for 8.9% of those jobs, Hispanics for 8.4%, Asians for 6.3%, 
women for 37.3%.33 Overall, then, although affirmative action in govern-
ment hiring is slowly moving minorities and women towards something 
approximating parity, Whites are still over-represented at the top of the 
career ladder, while Blacks and Hispanics are over-represented at the 
bottom.34 
Analysis of California's private sector reveals a similar pattern of 
employment along racial lines. Census figures from 1980 show that 
Whites, who make up 57% of California'S population, held 82.3% of mana-
gerial and professional jobs in the state. Ten years later, not much had 
changed; in 1990, the figure was 75.3%. Blacks in 1990 held only 5.1 % of 
management jobs, Latinos 9.56%, and Asians only 9%.35 Moreover, the net 
worth of African Americans in California averages $9,359 compared with 
$44,980 for Whites.36 About 31 % of African-American families in Califor-
nia make less than $15,000 a year, compared with 25% of Latino families, 
30 The statistic on "Asians" is somewhat misleading however, since "Asian" includes not only per-
sons of Chinese and Korean descent, who make up 23% of the 36%, but also East Indians, Pakis-
tanis (3%), Filipinos (2%), Japanese (2%), and Pacific Islanders (.3%), as well as an ambiguous 
category termed "other Asian" (5%). University of California, Berkeley Office of Student 
Research, New Undergraduates by Gender and Ethnicity (Fall 1995) (on file with author). 
31 Memorandum from Equal Rights Advocates to Affirmative Action Advocates 5 (Jan. 12, 1995) 
(on file with author). 
32 In 1993, the median income for Whites in public employment in California was $40,313, and for 
men, $42,556, while Blacks averaged $33,774, Hispanics $32,978, Asians $37,925, Native Amer-
icans $33,889, and women $31,897. CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, TAKING A LooK 
AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 5 (1995). 
33 ld. at 6. 
341d. 
3S Decker, supra note 29, at AI. 
36 Memorandum from Equal Rights Advocates to Affirmative Rights Advocates, supra note 31, at 3 
(citing a Jan. 1992 report by the CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH). 
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and just 16% of White families. Finally, in 1992 LatinoslLatinas made up 
37.5% of equipment operators, 55.5% of laborers, and 33.6% of service 
workers, as contrasted with just 5.6% of professional jobs.37 
Wilson and other opponents of affirmative action often have tried to 
blame these statistics on disparities in "merit" -a kind of intellectual Dar-
winism. In an attempt to quash this "myth of meritocracy," sociologists 
such as University of California at Berkeley Professor Jerome Karabel have 
begun to examine and expose the tenuous links between so-called "merit" 
and admissions to institutions of higher learning. Karabel has done exten-
sive studies of an ordinarily hidden type of affirmative action: children of 
alumni, or so-called "legacies." One study of Harvard's 1988 admissions 
discovered that if Harvard's legacies had gone through the normal admis-
sions process, instead of being given a "plus" factor, "the number of alumni 
offspring [admitted] would have fallen by nearly 200, a figure that exceeded 
the total of Blacks, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Native Ameri-
cans admitted as freshmen that year."38 A 1991 report by Berkeley's Insti-
tute for the Study of Social Change noted that overall, "far more Whites 
have entered the gates ofthe 10 most elite institutions through 'alumni pref-
erence' than the combined number of all the Blacks and Chicanos entering 
through affirmative action."39 
Nevertheless, Governor Wilson and the u.c. Regents maintain that 
affirmative action must be abolished statewide in order to make admissions 
and hiring criteria "fair and equal," a position which suggests they may 
have joined Justice Thomas and stepped through the looking glass. For, as 
has been noted by advocates of affirmative action, "the notion of 'fair and 
equal' is a cruel joke if you have been denied and systematically excluded 
from the institutions and experiences that provide you with the mastery of 
the requirements for entry into the playing field."40 Nevertheless, attacks 
on affirmative action have spread statewide with the proposed California 
Civil Rights Initiative. 
IV. THE INITIATIVE 
With the California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI") possibly looming 
over the November 1996 elections, the news media has conducted a series 
of polls to gauge the public mood around affirmative action programs.41 
According to researchers at the U.C. Berkeley Project on Equal Opportu-
37 [d. at 2. 
38 Elaine Woo, Belief in Meritocracy an Equal-Opportunity Myth. L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3D, 1995, at A I. 
39 [d. 
40 Memorandum from Equal Rights Advocates to Affirmative Action Advocates. supra note 31, at 
2. 
41 Memorandum from Lisa Stulberg to Project on Equal Opportunity, Synthesis of Affirmative 
Action Data (Nov. 30. 1995) (on file with author). 
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nity, support for affirmative action depends largely on two factors: (1) how 
the poll is worded, and (2) demographics. 
Where the term "affirmative action" is used, between 52% and 61 % of 
Californians generally express support for affirmative action programs. 
However, if the poll replaces the term "affirmative action" with "prefer-
ences" or "quotas," support falls drastically, among all racial and gender 
groupS.42 Finally, the California Civil Rights Initiative, which would pro-
hibit the use of "race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion 
for either discriminating against, or granting preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group in the operation of the state's system of public employ-
ment, public education, or public contracting,"43 receives much less support 
after its effects-the unilateral abolition of all affirmative action pro-
grams-are fully explained.44 Nevertheless, currently a slim majority of 
Californians appear to support the CCRI.45 
In summarizing her findings, Stulberg points out that: 
while no specific remedy ... gathers much public support, there is a general 
dislike and intolerance of "discrimination" and a desire for "equal opportuni-
ties" for all. Intolerance of discrimination and prejudice is widespread, with 
support for stronger laws against and punishment for discrimination ranging 
from 64 to 78% (Feldman Poll, May 1995). Support for the concept of equal 
opportunities is also very strong, ranging from 64 to 79% support for pro-
grams designed to facilitate equal opportunities for women and people of 
color (Harris and Feldman Polls).46 
The tension highlighted in this last point-strong support for equal 
opportunities yet hesitant or weak support for affirmative action pro-
grams-underlies the entire affirmative action debate. Seemingly, very few 
people would want to deny a remedy to a person who could prove they had 
personally experienced tangible prejudice. However, it remains difficult to 
form a consensus on the pervasive nature of systemic societal discrimina-
tion and the need for a legal remedy, even in the face of powerful statistics. 
Thus, discrimination seems to some as either non-existent or invisible, even 
though-like the Cheshire Cat-it is at all times everywhere. The conclu-
sion of this piece will discuss pervasive biases that seem most often to dis-
tort reality, and allow opponents of affirmative action to deny that 
discrimination still mandates a legal remedy. 
42/d. at 5. 
43 CAL. SENATE OFFiCE OF REsEARCH, TAXING A LooK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 3 (1995). 
44 When one pollster explained to his respondents that CCRI would end affinnative action for 
women and minorities, support for the initiative dropped from 81 % to 29%. Ellen Debenport, 
AjJirfTUJtive Action is Hardly Detested by Public, Poll Finds. ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 26, 
1995, at 3A. 
4S Memorandom from Lisa Stolberg to Project on Equal Opportunity, Synthesis of CCRI Public 
Opinion Data 2 (Nov. 30, 1995). 
46 Memorandom from Lisa Stolberg to Project on Equal Opportunity, supra note 41, at 9. 
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V" CONCLUSION 
Three pervasive themes throughout discussions on affirmative action 
suggest the biases which stand in the way of affirmative action opponents' 
recognition of discrimination and the need for a remedy. They are the myth 
of meritocracy, the politics of denial, and unconscious racism. These biases 
pervade modern discussions of affirmative action, and often form the basis 
for the distinction people insist upon making between remediable and 
nonremediable prejudice. 
First, the myth of meritocracy suggests that in modern day America, 
we have a "level playing field" which is unfairly tilted by affirmative action 
programs. Professor Harley Shaiken, a U.C. Berkeley education professor, 
argues that "[t]he notion that we at one point had a system based on merit 
and then gratuitously introduced affirmative action (is an argument that) 
[sic] rewrites history. It is a powerful and confining myth."47 In reality, as 
the work of Karabel and others have shown, our society is loaded with 
preferences-for Whites and men. 
Second, the phrase "politics of denial" refers to the tendency of those 
in power to sweep evidence of racism and discrimination under the rug and 
declare affirmative action either no longer necessary, unfair because based 
upon past "sins" for which they bear no current responsibility, or mis-
targeted at women and people of color (as opposed to groups who are disad-
vantaged in other ways). For example, Presidential candidate Robert Dole 
argued recently that "[t]he people of America now are paying a price for 
things that were done before they were born .... We did discriminate. We 
did suppress people. It was wrong .... But should future generations have 
to pay for that?"48 And Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich has remarked 
that discrimination has been experienced by "virtually every American," 
noting, for example, that the Irish were discriminated against by the 
English.49 
History professor Roger Wilkins has noted that the "politics of denial" 
can appear not only in the form of overt racism, but that it can also skew the 
perspectives of White Americans "who are not racists but who more or less 
passively accept the powerful suggestions coming at them from all points in 
the culture that Whites are entitled to privilege and to freedom from compe-
tition with Blacks."50 Wilkins concludes that, though racism in society is 
powerful, violent, and deadly, "millions of Americans who are deemed 
sane-some of whom are powerful and some even thought wise-deny, 
wholly or in part, that racism exists."51 
47 woo. supra note 38. at AI. 
48 Decker. supra note 29. at AI. 
49 Roger Wilkins. Racism has its Privileges. THE NATION. Mar. 27. 1995. at 409.412. 
so Id. 
SlId. 
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Finally, there is the omnipresent problem of unconscious racism, a 
problem that has led law professors and psychologists alike to fear aloud 
that racism ultimately is intractable. In "The Id, The Ego, and Equal Pro-
tection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism,"52 Professor Charles Law-
rence argues that racism is not only a "crime," but a "disease," infecting 
almost everyone. To Lawrence: 
[a]cknowledging and understanding the malignancy are prerequisites to the 
discovery of an appropriate cure .... Americans share a common historical 
and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant 
role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, 
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and 
induce negative feelings and opinions about non-Whites. To the extent that 
this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the 
same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the 
ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race 
or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a 
large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by 
unconscious racial motivation.53 
Psychological studies of racism support Lawrence's analysis of dis-
crimination as part outright racism, part unconscious "racial nepotism." 
These studies suggest that some discrimination is caused by cognitive 
" 'weak points' that cause people to see what they expect to see, and to 
reject any information-any 'unusual objects' -that would challenge their 
already established point of view."54 Discrimination results when the "unu-
sual objects" are women and minorities filling out applications for White 
and/or male bosses. Due to these cognitive weak points, it may be virtually 
impossible for Whites and/or males to see these applicants as qualified for 
certain jobs. 55 
Of course, the acknowledgment of unconscious racism was what 
spurred the enactment of affirmative action programs in the first place. 
Affirmative action programs require institutions and individuals to break 
with "business as usual" and make an effort to search for qualified candi-
dates from previously untapped sources. 56 According to one Los Angeles 
Times pollster, "[t]he real challenge for the proponents of affirmative action 
is not to make the argument that there's still prejudice .... They have to 
make an argument that the tools they want to use are fair. That's tough."57 
The question remains, however, whether the controlled bias we call 
affirmative action is less "fair" than the many invisible, uncontrolled, and 
unmonitored biases in our educational, economic, and social systems. The 
S2 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
S3 ld. at 321-23. 
S4 K.C. Cole. Brain's Use of Shortcuts Can be a Route to Bias, L.A. TIMES. May I, 1995. at AI. 
551d. 
56 Wilkins, supra note 50. at 409, 409. 
57 Cathleen Decker, Most Back Anti-Bias Policy but Spurn Racial Preferences. L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
1995. at AI. 
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battle over affirmative action ultimately asks whether we are willing to pay 
the moral, political, and social costs of dismantling thirty years of hard-won 
civil rights gains in the name of what is at best a false "consistency," and at 
worst a cynical exchange of the facts for an absurd, distorted fantasy. 
